





Household Responses to Adverse Income




This paper uses a new data set to study household responses to ad-
verse income shocks in seven Latin American countries. The results
show (i) that households respond to income shocks mainly by increas-
ing their labor force participation, selling assets, and cutting on hu-
man capital investments, (ii) that poor households are most likely to
be affected by adverse income shocks, and (iii) that lower-middle class
households are more likely to cut back human capital investments
and move abroad when faced with an adverse income shock. Taken
together, these results offer ample justification for publicly funded
safety nets targeted at the poor.
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Macroeconomic volatility is a fact of life in Latin America, and a
puzzling one at that. While booms and busts come and go, analysts
keep changing their theories and their prescriptions. But if there is
little agreement about the causes of volatility, there is growing con-
sensus about its effects. During crises, poverty and inequality surge,
and educational, health and nutritional indicators deteriorate, espe-
cially among the poor. Additionally, the deterioration is often perma-
nent in that it is not easily reverted when income levels rise again1.
This paper uses a new data set to study household responses to ad-
verse income shocks in seven Latin American countries. Our main
goal is to study the extent to which households respond to adverse
income shocks by cutting back human capital investments, selling
productive physical assets or reacting in any other way that can ad-
versely affect future outcomes. In addition, we investigate the extent
to which adverse income shocks affect households from different so-
cioeconomic strata, as well as the difference between rich and poor
households in their responses to crisis. By doing this, we hope to pro-
vide some clues as to why crises can permanently affect social indica-
tors, and ultimately to shed some light on policies aimed at reducing
the deleterious effects of crises.
The data set used in this paper was especially designed to measure
household responses to crises. This data set uses a series of retrospec-
tive questions about socioeconomic outcomes before and during the
crisis of 1999 in order to circumvent the lack of longitudinal data that
has hindered most previous attempts to investigate the effects of an
economic downturn on the fortunes of households. The data, how-
ever, has only qualitative information. It reveals, for example, whether
or not a given household experienced an income drop, but it does not
reveal the magnitude of the drop. This problem notwithstanding, the
data at hand provides a unique glimpse of household responses to
adverse income shocks.





We find that households respond to adverse income shocks mainly by
selling assets and disinvesting in human capital. Presumably, both
strategies are inefficient in that households would have acted differ-
ently if they had access to traditional smoothing mechanisms. Moreo-
ver, both strategies may have large negative effects upon the life
prospects of those involved. We also find that poorer households are
not only more liable to experience adverse income shocks during cri-
sis, but also more likely to respond by disinvesting in human capital.
Taken together, these results offer ample justification for publicly
funded safety nets targeted at the poor.
I. Motivation
Crises are times of turmoil for households. During crises some house-
holds reduce their consumption or sell luxury goods, while others move
abroad or cut back on their human capital investments. While some of
these adjustments are of little consequence, others may have sizable
long-term effects upon the socioeconomic outcomes of those involved.
Thus, those who dropped out of school due to an income shock sub-
stantially reduce their socioeconomic prospects. Also, those who leave
their countries often have to cope with the sudden depreciation of a
large part of their human capital.
Figure 1 summarizes the main lines of inquiry of this paper. First, it
studies the various ways in which families react to adverse income
shocks, focusing on a few prominent “coping” strategies: increases in
labor force participation, sales of physical assets and moving abroad.
And second, it studies the extent to which adverse income shocks are
associated with welfare losses, focusing on the role of savings and
credit in shielding households from temporary drops in their current
incomes.
Our analysis will shed light on the three important issues: (i) the rela-
tive importance of the different household strategies under considera-
tion (section 3), (ii) the role of savings and credit in protecting
households from steep consumption drops (section 4), and (iii) the
differences among socioeconomic groups in the way they cope with





understand household behavior during crises and ultimately to guide
the design of safety nets and public assistance programs, in general.
There have been several recent studies looking at household responses
to income shocks during economic downturns. Cunningham and
Malloney (2000) use longitudinal data to study the changing fortunes
of a group of Mexican families before, during and after the crisis of
1994-95, concluding that poorer families were better able to cope with
the crisis owing mainly to their greater ability to increase their labor
supply in the face of an income shock. Gaviria (2000), for his part,
uses a dataset similar to the one used in this paper to study who su-
ffered the most during the Colombian crisis of 1999, concluding that
the poor were not only most likely to lose income and reduce con-
sumption, but also appear to have less flexibility to respond to income
shocks. It remains unclear, however, whether the seemingly opposite
conclusions of these studies are due to differences between the coun-
tries and situations under consideration or to differences in the data
and the methodologies used2.
In more general terms, Lustig (2000) argues vehemently that economic
downturns often cause poor households to disinvest and reduce their
assets, including their human capital. In her view, crises do have nega-
tive long-term consequences upon the fortunes of the poor, which gives
ample justification to publicly funded safety nets aimed at shielding
poor (and perhaps middle class households as well) from adverse in-
come shocks. The relevance of these policies, as well as the validity
of the facts that justify them, is the main topic of this paper3.
II. Data Description
This paper uses a new set of surveys to study household responses to
income shocks in Latin America. These surveys were designed spe-
2 One could argue, for example, that whereas richer families are less likely to be affected by
adverse income shocks, the ones who are affected usually lose a higher fraction of their
income. This will render the two studies consistent with each other.
3 See Gill and Ulahi (2000) for a conceptual discussion of policy making and economic






cifically for this purpose by a team of researchers from the Inter-
American Development Bank4, and were carried out during the first
semester of 2000 in seven Latin American countries: Colombia, Ec-
uador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela.
Samples are representative of the urban populations of the countries
under analysis, and comprise approximately 1000 households in each
country.
Table 1 presents a few descriptive statistics of the countries under
analysis. PPP adjusted GDP per head is very low in these countries,
much lower than in the average Latin American country with the ex-
ceptions of Colombia and Venezuela. Inequality is very high in all
countries with the exception of Venezuela. And more relevant for the
purpose of this paper, the economic downturn that affected most Latin
American countries in 1999 (the year of the survey) was especially
accentuated in most of the countries considered and especially in those
from the Andean region.
By and large, the survey includes three types of questions. The first
type refers to the specific nature of the income shocks endured by the
households (e.g., whether a member lost his job or a family business
went bankrupt). The second refers to the reactions of the households
to the purported income shocks (e.g., whether a member entered the
labor market or physical assets were sold). The third refers to socio-
economic characteristics of the households (e.g., schooling of the
household head and dwelling characteristics).
We assume throughout that a household experienced an income shock
if at least one of the following events took place: (i) a member lost his
job, (ii) a member experienced a drop in his earnings, (iii) a family
business went bankrupt, and (iv) a family business experienced a sub-
stantial drop in its revenue. Table 2 shows that almost 45% of the
households reported the occurrence of at least one of these events in
1999: 30% reported that at least one member was laid off during 1999
4 The survey was designed for Eduardo Lora of the research Department and Gilberto
Moncada of the Poverty Unit. The question has two main shortcomings: almost all ques-
tions are qualitative and the information about household attributes is limited. Moreover,





and 15% that they owned a business that had to shut down during the
same period.
We assume that a household experienced a drop in consumption if
each one of the following events took place: (i) a household member
stopped buying non-essential goods, (ii) tried to buy cheaper or lower
quality goods, (iii) reduced its spending on entertainment, and (iv)
postponed the acquisition of durable goods. Although this definition
is quite restrictive and may well leave out some households that did
experience consumption drops, laxer definitions yielded unreason-
ably large fractions of households experiencing consumption losses,
which may reflect the willingness of people to complain indiscrimi-
nately in times of crisis. Despite the stringent conditions, 28% of the
households interviewed experienced a consumption loss according to
our definition.
Table 2 also shows the incidence of the household responses under
consideration. More than one fifth of the households reported that at
least one member entered the labor market and a similar percentage
reported that the household head increased the number of hours
worked. More than 10% reported that one or more members had to
drop out of school and a similar fraction reported that they sold assets
to protect their incomes. Finally, five percent of the households re-
ported that at least one member moved abroad during 1999.
Table 3 shows that there are sizable cross national differences in the
variables under analysis. Income shocks affected over half of house-
holds in Ecuador and Venezuela and 20% of households in Honduras.
Consumption falls affected 60% of households in Ecuador and only
10% in Honduras. The fraction of households reporting that at least
one member entered the labor market was the highest in Ecuador, as
was the fraction of households reporting that at least one member had
to drop out of school. Honduras had the largest fraction of households
reporting more hours worked by primary earner, Colombia the largest
fraction reporting the sale of assets, and Ecuador the largest fraction
reporting the emigration abroad of at least one of its members.
In general, the extent of household reactions is positively correlated





tries where a larger fraction of households report losing income are
also countries where a larger fraction of households report an increase
in their labor force participation (or having members who dropped
out of school). Also, the fraction of households reporting consump-
tion drops and the growth rates of GDP in 1999 are negatively corre-
lated at the national level: the correlation coefficient is above 0.5 and
significant at the standard levels. Although the subsequent analysis
will not use cross-country differences, focusing mainly on the rela-
tionship between income shocks and household reactions at the house-
hold level, it is comforting to notice that cross-country differences
show consistent patterns of variation.
Are the rich less vulnerable?
The data at hand permits an examination of how the probabilities of
losing income and reducing consumption vary with the socioeconomic
status of a household. Since households that lost income are more
likely to appear in the lower ends of the income distribution, this prob-
ability will be, by construction, higher among the poorest households.
It would be erroneous, however, to conclude from this result that poor
households are more likely to experience income losses, as this asso-
ciation is merely mechanical. To circumvent this problem, indicators
of socioeconomic status that less depend of short-term fluctuations of
household income should be used. Various indicators have been pro-
posed in the literature, ranging from the education of the household
head to the mean income of the neighborhood of residence.
In this paper, we use an alternative indicator based on household pos-
sessions of durable goods and dwelling characteristics. Specifically,
we use the information listed on note 5 to rank households according
to their socioeconomic status and to construct quintiles of socioeco-
nomic status5. Our approach involves three main steps. First, we use
principal components to compute a weighted average of the relevant
household attributes, then we rank all households on the basis of this
average, and last we use the ranking to compute quintiles of socioeco-
5 The household assets and dwelling characteristics used to measure socioeconomic status
were: access to drinkable water and sewage systems, and possessions of telephone, color tv,





nomic status6. The quintiles can be interpreted as reflecting the long-
term position of the households in terms of socioeconomic status—an
interpretation supported by the fact that the average schooling of the
household head increases monotonically as one moves from the lower
to the upper quintiles7.
Figure 2 shows that the probability of losing income is lower in the
upper quintiles than in the lower ones, and that the differences be-
tween poor and middle class households are in general non signifi-
cant8. The same figure shows that a similar pattern holds for the
probability of reducing consumption, which underlines the fact that
rich households tend to be less vulnerable. The higher vulnerability
of the poor is exacerbated by the fact that income downturns can have
a more devastating effect on those living close to subsistence levels9.
Various mechanisms can explain the relatively higher vulnerability of
poorer households. Poor unskilled workers not only tend to work in
more volatile sectors (construction is a case in point), but are also
disproportionately represented in the informal sector, which is also
more responsive to macroeconomic fluctuations. In addition, unskilled
workers are often the first to be laid-off when firms adjust their pro-
duction in the face of an economic downturn.
A few recent studies have suggested that the higher probability of
poor households to lose income is offset by its higher ability to in-
6 Principal components are often used to approximate socioeconomic status in the absence
of reliable income data. Filmer and Pritchett (1998) show that durable goods and housing
attributes are observed with much more precision than consumption expenditures, and that
indicators of socioeconomic status based on these variables are much less sensitive to
temporary disturbances on household welfare than similar indicators based on consump-
tion data.
7 Mean schooling of the head is 4.7 in the first quintile, 6.4 in the second, 7.5 in the third, 9.3
in he fourth and 11.5 in the fifth.
8 Country fixed-effects were removed prior to the calculation of the inter-quintile differ-
ences.
9 According to the Colombian household survey for June of 2000, the annual income per
capita of an urban household located in the 80th percentile is around US$ 7000 dollars,
meaning some households of the top quintiles (“rich”) in Colombia can be poor by O.E.C.D.





crease their labor supply in bad times10. Even if this is true, and we
will return to this point in section 5, it is also true that the rich are
more likely to have savings, which allows them to protect their con-
sumption levels. In this respect, figure 3 shows that the fraction of
households that report to have savings increases geometrically across
quintiles of socioeconomic status. Summing, the available evidence
clearly indicates that rich and middle-income households are less vul-
nerable, which allows us to answer affirmatively the question posed
above11.
On a related point, unreported results show that the schooling of the
head does not appear to have an effect on vulnerability beyond its
effect on the socioeconomic status of the household, which runs counter
to the idea that education not only increases the level of income, but
reduces the volatility of income as well. Households whose heads are
older than 60 or younger than 25 are less likely to lose income and
reduce consumption (the relevant probabilities are at least five per-
centage points lower in both cases), which suggests that families tend
to be more vulnerable precisely when they are making the key human
capital investments.
III. Main Results
In this section, we study the correlations between the probability of
losing income and that of engaging in the various coping strategies
listed in figure 1. We first examine these correlations at an aggregate
level and then do the same at the household level. Although we will
refrain from making strong causality claims, we will argue that the
magnitude of the correlations is illustrative about the magnitude of
households responses to adverse income shocks.
10 See, for example, Cunningham and Malloney (2000) for the case of Mexico.
11 There is a sense in which rich and middle class households are more vulnerable than poor
households: they are more likely to be victimized. The probability of being a victim of a
crime in the six months previous to the survey is about 11 percent for first three quintiles
and about 14% for the last two. (see Gaviria and Pages, 2001 for a comprehensive study of






Figure 4 plots the fraction of households that lost income in a given
quintile of a given country against the fraction of households that en-
gage in each one of the strategies under consideration (quintile num-
bers are shown in the graph to ease interpretation). Overall, we have
35 five observations: five quintiles and seven countries. The idea is to
use the variation across countries and quintiles to assess the impor-
tance of the five strategies under analysis. Although these correla-
tions may be driven by unobserved country attributes (or by unobserved
differences between rich and poor households), they provide a useful
first pass to the data.
As shown, the probability of losing income is strongly associated with
the probability that a household member will enter the labor market:
an increase of 10 percentage points in the first is associated with an
increase of almost 3 points in the second (a 13% increase over the
mean value). The evidence indicates, then, that labor supply at the
household level appears to be negatively related to household in-
come—a result usually referred to in the literature as the hypothesis
of the added worker.
The connection between the probability of losing income and the prob-
ability that a household member will drop out of school is even
stronger: an increase of 10 percentage points in the first is related to
an increase of more 3 points in the second (a 26% jump over the mean
value). Moreover, the fluctuations of the first account for over 60 per-
cent of the fluctuations of the second, pointing to the fact that reduc-
tions of household income have much to do with the decisions of
cutting back in human capital investments. Indeed, reducing these
investments appears to be a disturbing consequence of adverse in-
come shocks, confirming the conjectures mentioned in section 1.
Unlike the previous cases, the evidence show that, at least in the ag-
gregate, working longer hours is not associated with the occurrence
of adverse income shocks. If anything, the opposite is true. On aver-
age, the lower the fraction of households losing income, the higher
the fraction of households in which the primary earner worked longer
hours than before. It must be pointed out, however, that this result is
likely to be driven by unobserved country characteristics. In Hondu-





the head worked longer hours than he used to contrasts with the very
small fraction of households reporting that at least one member expe-
rienced substantial income losses.
The probabilities of selling household assets and moving abroad are
also positively associated with the probability of losing income. An
increase of 10 percentage points in the latter is associated with an
increase of one point and one quarter of point in these magnitudes. In
both cases, however, the points are less tightly clustered than in the
previous figures, suggesting that other forces, which may have little
to do with the propensity of losing income, play an important role in
explaining these outcomes.
As mentioned above, the previous analysis should be interpreted with
caution because the results may be driven by unobserved characteris-
tics, not only of countries but of households as well. In what follows,
we intend to control as thoroughly as possible for the different sources
of unobserved heterogeneity, seeking to better isolate the responses
of households to income disturbances.
The analysis is based on the following model
iqc q c iqc iqc iqc X S R ε γ λ β α + + + + = (1)
where R is a dummy variable showing whether household i who be-
longs to quintile q and lives in country c engage in the coping strategy
under consideration; S is another dummy showing whether the same
household experiences an adverse income shock; X is a vector of
household attributes, including the age and education of the head; γ
and λ  are quintile and country fixed effects, respectively; and ε  is an
error term. We focus mainly on the value of the parameter α , which
measures the propensity of households to engage in the strategy un-
der consideration in the face of an adverse income shock: the higher
this value, the higher the propensity.
We use a Probit model to estimate Equation (1). Alternative estima-
tion methods yield almost identical results. We estimate equation (1)
for each one of the five households strategies under consideration:





assets and moving abroad, and present the results of several alterna-
tive specifications in each case. We report marginal effects evaluated
at mean values.
Table 4 presents the estimation results for increases in labor force
participation and dropping out of school, the first two strategies under
scrutiny. As shown, households that lost income were much more likely
to have had a member entering the labor market. The coefficient is
smaller than that implied by figure 4 but still substantial: an increase
of 10 percentage points in the probability of losing income is asso-
ciated with an increase of 1.5 percentage points in the probability of
having a member joining the labor force. Moreover, this probability
goes down as either the education or the age of the household head go
up. All else being equal, each year of education is associated with a
reduction in the probability in question of half of a percentage point.
The previous results remain almost unaltered if quintile effects are
added to the specification: the value of α  is the same in both cases, as
are the coefficients attached to the age variables. The same is not true,
however, for the education of the head, whose coefficient goes down
and loses significance after quintile effects are introduced, suggesting
that education affects the probability of joining the labor force mostly
through its effect upon the socioeconomic status of a household.
Table 4 also shows that the probability of having a member leaving
school is affected by the probability of losing income: a ten-percent-
age-point increase in the former is associated with a one-percentage-
point increase in the latter. Moreover, the probability in question is
related to the age and education of the household head in predictable
ways: households who have older and more educated heads are less
likely to have a member dropping out of school. As in the previous
case, these results are roughly similar after adding quintile effects to
the specification. But unlike the previous case, the education of the
head appears to have an effect on the probability of having a member
leaving school that is independent of its effect upon the socioeco-
nomic status of the household. This suggests that children of less edu-
cated parents are more likely to drop out of school even after the effect






Figure 5 shows that the fraction of households reporting that at least
one member left school during 1999 decreases as one moves from
poorer to richer households12. The same figure also shows that inter-
quintile differences are substantially smaller once we control for the
greater propensity of poor households to both lose income and cut
back consumption levels. According to the figure, 30% of the differ-
ences between the top and bottom quintiles in the probabilities of scal-
ing back human capital investments in a given year can be explained
by differences in vulnerability. Presumably, an even larger percent-
age would be explained if we had controlled for inter-quintile differ-
ences in the value of α 13.
The previous results show that differences in vulnerability explain (i)
the bulk of the differences across countries in the fractions of house-
holds reporting that at least one member left school, (ii) a large frac-
tion of the differences across quintiles of the same probability, and
(iii) a sizable fraction of the intra-quintile differences among house-
holds of the probability in question. When taken together, this evi-
dence provides ample justification for policies aimed at preventing
households from responding to adverse income shocks by cutting back
their investment in human capital. Such policies will not only have
important implications in terms of equity, but also in terms of effi-
ciency.
Table 5 examines the association between vulnerability and the other
household strategies under consideration. The first two columns show
that there exists a positive correlation between the probability of los-
ing income and the probability that the household head will work longer
hours than previously, which indicates that households heads do re-
spond to adverse income shocks by expanding their labor supply—a
result that clearly contradicts the evidence presented in figure 4. This
12 This result may be bias, the fact that we do not control for the number of children in a
household: poorer households have more children which raises the probability that at least
one of them will drop out at any time. Unfortunately, the survey does not contain informa-
tion about household size.
13 If we allow to differ among quintiles, differences in vulnerability explain as much as 70%






contradiction underlines the perils of using differences among coun-
tries to study household reactions, especially when institutional and
other factors that affect the relationships under analysis can not be
adequately controlled for.
Table 5 also shows that the propensity to expand one’s labor supply
diminishes with age and increases with education. The difference be-
tween older and younger workers is striking: those under 25 are al-
most three times as likely to increase hours as those over 60. The
differences between educated and uneducated workers are smaller but
still substantial: those with at least a year of college are twice as likely
to work more than those with at most primary education.
The intermediate columns of table 5 indicate that households respond
to adverse income shocks by selling physical assets. These
disinvestments appear to be considerable, at least in light of the large
difference in the probability of selling assets between households that
lost income and households that did not: 9.2 percentage points (or
90%). Finally, the right-most columns of table 5 indicate that house-
holds also respond to shocks by emigrating abroad. Here the difference
in the relevant probabilities between household that lost income and
households that did not is almost 1.5 percentage points—a 25 percent
difference with respect to the average propensity to move abroad14.
All in all, the results of tables 4 and 5 indicate that, to a greater or
lesser extent, households resort to all the strategies under considera-
tion to alleviate the short-term effects of adverse income shocks. We
can use estimated values of a divided by the mean prevalence of the
strategy in question to gauge the relative importance of the different
strategies. The idea is to use a “normalized” difference between house-
holds who lost income and households who did not in the probability
to engage in a strategy in order to assess the importance of the strat-
egy. After doing this, we find that the most “important” strategies are:
selling assets, reducing human capital investments and increasing labor
14 Households that report having at least one member victimized were two percentage points
more likely to move abroad that households that report the contrary. Crime is as much a





force participation15. The remaining strategies, expanding one’s labor
supply and migrating abroad, are still important, but much less com-
mon. This ranking suggests that the most common strategies used by
households entail actions that, regardless of their short-term effec-
tiveness, have deleterious effects that long outlive the shocks that trig-
gered them.
IV. Income Losses and Consumption Drops
In times of crisis, many households reduce consumption, not only
because their disposable income goes down, but also because they
adjust downwardly their income prospects. In this section, we study
the interplay between consumption drops and income losses, focus-
ing on the effects of the availability of savings and credit in prevent-
ing the translation of adverse income shocks into consumption drops.
It is worth noting that the probability of losing income explains more
than 60% of the variation across countries and quintiles in the prob-
abilities of reducing consumption, suggesting that income and con-
sumption shocks are highly correlated. This result indicates either that
many households lack the resources and means to protect themselves
against adverse income shocks (e.g., they do not have savings and do
not have access to credit) or that they foresee that adverse shocks will
permanently affect their income prospects (e.g., laid-off workers pre-
dict that their employability has decreased and entrepreneurs predict
that the competitiveness of their businesses has permanently suffered).
The analysis of this section is based on the following model:
iqc q c iqc iqc iqc iqc iqc X CRED SAV R C ε γ λ β φ φ φ + + + + + + = 3 2 1 (2)
where subscripts have the same interpretations as before; C is a dummy
variable showing whether the household in question reduced its con-
sumption; and R, SAV and CRED are also dummies, showing whether
15 Ideally, we should compare the elasticities of the relevant probabilities with respect to the
changes in household income but that can not be obtained on the basis of the data at hand,





the same household lost income, had savings and received credit du-
ring 1999, respectively. We use a Probit model to estimate equation
(2) and report marginal effects evaluated at mean values.
Table 6 shows, not surprisingly, that households which lost income
are much more likely to reduce their consumption levels than house-
holds that did not: the probability of cutting back consumption is at
least 10 percentage points higher in the former than in the latter. There
are two alternative ways to interpret this result. One can argue that
income losses often translate into consumption drops by either of the
two mechanisms mentioned above. But one can argue alternatively
that consumption drops are by no means limited to those households
who did experience income losses.
Table 6 also shows that household who had savings were much less
likely to reduce their consumption than households who did not. The
size of the effect is quite large and does not depend on whether we
control for the education of the head or the socioeconomic status of
the household. In contrast, households who received credit are mar-
ginally more likely to reduce their consumption, which may be a re-
flection of the fact that the most affected households are more likely
to ask for credit in order to ameliorate the effect of the crisis (i.e.,
there is reverse causality).
The age of the head appears to be consistently related to the probabil-
ity of reducing consumption levels even after controlling for whether
or not a household lost income. Households whose head is either
younger than 25 or older than 60 are less likely to report that they
adjust their consumption level downward, which may be linked to the
fact that these household are less likely to have children living at home.
Finally, the education of the head has only a marginal negative effect
on the probability of reducing consumption, and this effect is trans-
mitted mostly through the socioeconomic status of the household (i.e.,
more educated heads live in richer households which are in turn less





V. Do rich and poor households behave differently in
times of crisis?
The rich are different from the poor, and not only because they have
got more money. Rich and poor households, in particular, respond
differently in the face of adverse income shocks. The rich, for exam-
ple, can often avoid extreme responses such as emigrating or cutting back
on human capital investments, as they not only have better access to in-
come-smoothing mechanisms, but also are better able to endure an in-
come drop—if only because they are not fighting for survival.
The analysis of this section is based on the following model:
iqc q c iqc j iqc
j





where qj is a dummy variable showing whether household i belongs
to quintile j (the first quintile is the baseline group), α  measures the
mean propensity of a household from the first quintile to engage in S,
and α +α j measures the same propensity for the jth quintile. The rest of
the variables and parameters are the same as before. We use a Probit
model to estimate equation (3) and report marginal effects.
Figure 6 plots the values α , α  + α 2, α  + α 3, α  + α 4, and α  + α 5 against
the corresponding quintiles. Mean propensities for all households,
taken from tables 4 and 5, are also shown for comparative purposes.
Only those differences that are statistically significant are referred to
in the discussion that follows.
Figure 6 shows that households from the upper quintiles are less likely
to respond to an adverse income shock by increasing their labor su-
pply, which may be explained by two factors. First, relatively richer
households usually have other means to deal with income shocks (they
are more likely to have savings, to own liquid assets and to have ac-
cess to credit). And second, richer households usually have less flex-
ibility to increase their labor force participation, if only because
two-earner household are more common among rich and middle class
households than among poorer ones16.
16 In Latin America, female labor force participation is 36.7 in the bottom 30% of the income





In the same vein, figure 6 shows that households from the second
quintile are especially prone to respond to an income shock by cutting
back human capital investments. The large difference between the
first and second quintile suggests that the poorest households do not
have more to lose from an adverse income shock. Presumably the
most disadvantaged households stopped investing in human capital
well before the crisis hit, while those in the intermediate quintiles are
still investing, perhaps through great effort, which puts them in a more
precarious position.
This result, if confirmed by further research, could have wide-rang-
ing policy implications. Cash transfers conditional on children going
to school are increasingly perceived as the most effective way to pre-
vent households from disinvesting in human capital in times of crisis.
The largest of these programs, Progresa in Mexico and Familias en
acción in Colombia, are targeted at very poor households living in
rural areas. The previous results suggest, however, that this might be
not the best course of action, at least not when considering efficiency.
Indeed, relaxing the thresholds of participation, so as to include not
only the poorest of the poor, could increase the effectiveness of such
programs in terms of insuring school attendance.
Turning back to figure 6, we also find that the propensity of house-
hold heads to respond to an adverse income shock by working longer
hours is higher among households from the third and fourth quintiles
(the differences are not very large and are marginally significant).
Although the data offers no clues as to why this is so, one may argue
that many poor people, especially in the informal sector, work too
many hours already that they have less flexibility in expanding their
labor supply. The richest workers, for their part, labor mainly in the
formal sector, where employment contracts are more rigid and ex-
panding one’s labor supply is more difficult.
In reference to selling physical assets, no substantial differences among
quintiles are apparent. Unreported results show, however, that while
the poor are more likely to sell household appliances, the rich are
more likely to sell vehicles and real estate. For emigration, in con-
trast, there are some large differences among quintiles: poorer house-





move abroad in the face of an adverse income shock. The reasons are
again not clear at all, but one can argue that the poor need a smaller push
to leave their countries, if only because they have much less to lose.
Conclusions
This paper studies household responses to adverse income shocks in
times of crisis. It is shown, first, that households respond to income
shocks mainly by increasing their labor force participation, by selling
assets, and by disinvesting in human capital. It is also shown that
poor households are most likely to be affected by adverse income
shocks. Finally it is shown that poor (but not the poorest) households
are more prone to cut back human capital investments and emigrate
abroad in the face of an adverse income shock.
These results suggest that adverse income shocks can have deleteri-
ous effects on human capital accumulation, especially among poorer
households. If we consider both the greater likelihood of poor house-
holds to experience income shocks as well as their greater propensity
to cut back human capital investments, we can conclude that poor
households are four times as likely as rich households to stop invest-
ing in human capital when faced with aggregated shocks. This may
explain why macroeconomic crises usually cause irreversibly surges
in inequality and why school attendance among the poor plunges du-
ring crises.
This paper has two main policy implications. First, it reinforces the
case for publicly funded safety nets. In light of the evidence, safety
nets appear to have ample justification, not only on equity grounds
but on efficiency grounds as well. And second, it shows that assist-
ance programs aimed at keeping children in school should not be tar-
geted exclusively at the poorest of the poor. In light of the evidence,
such programs could be more effective if the targeted population also
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Country GDP per head Gini Growth rate 1999
Nicaragua 1441 0.565 3.7%
Guatemala 2292 0.557 3.6%
Honduras 1321 0.528 -1.9%
Paraguay 1939 0.569 0.5%
Ecuador 2941 0.560 -7.3%
Venezuela 6108 0.470 -7.2%
Colombia 3788 0.576 -4.3%
Latin America 3715 0.528 0.7%
GDP per head is taken from World Bank Development Indicators (1998).
Gini coefficients are taken from Szekely and Hilgert (2000).
Growth Rates are Taken from IMF Financial Statistics (2000).
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Household lost income in 1999 44.5%
Household member lost job during 1999 30.7%
Household business went broke during 1999 15.4%
Household reduced consumption in 1999 28.2%
Household entered the labor market in 1999 21.9%
Household member left school in 1999 11.5%
Household head increased hours worked in 1999 24.6%
Household sold physical assets in 1999 10.1%
Household member emigrated in 1999 5.3%
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Loss of Fall in Increase in Dropping Out Increased in Asset Migration
Pais Income Consumption Participation Hours Worked Sale Abroad
Nicaragua 48.4% 14.4% 23.7% 12.8% 22.4% 6.6% 8.3%
Guatemala 35.7% 26.4% 17.6% 7.9% 26.5% 4.5% 2.8%
Honduras 21.5% 9.5% 24.8% 7.5% 37.1% 9.1% 8.4%
Paraguay 48.3% 35.6% 23.7% 12.6% 21.2% 12.6% 4.8%
Ecuador 67.6% 59.4% 32.2% 18.6% 27.6% 13.7% 9.5%
Venezuela 52.8% 29.1% 20.9% 14.8% 24.9% 7.1% 2.7%








Household lost income 0.159 0.155 0.091 0.089
(15.80)** (15.42)** (12.34)** (12.04)**
Schooling of the head -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004
(4.89)** (1.69) (6.69)** (4.10)**
Head older than 60 -0.104 -0.098 -0.047 -0.044
(7.01)** (6.56)** (4.32)** (4.02)**
Head younger than 25 0.059 0.057 0.031 0.030
(3.38)** (3.24)** (2.46)* (2.35)*
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quintile fixed-effects No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.070 0.066 0.067
Observations 7204 7197 7229 7222
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 5% level; **Significant at 1% level.
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More hours by head Sale o assets Migration abroad
Household lost income 0.104 0.105 0.094 0.092 0.013 0.014
(9.26)** (9.37)** (13.63)** (13.32)** (2.67)** (2.93)**
Schooling of the head 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.001 <0.000
(8.83)** (6.74)** (1.52) (3.56)** (2.14)* (0.44)
Head older than 60 -0.116 -0.120 -0.039 -0.035 0.010 0.007
(6.50)** (6.66)** (3.86)** (3.41)** (1.51) (1.12)
Head younger than 25 0.078 0.080 0.022 0.018 0.017 0.018
(4.07)** (4.14)** (1.82) (1.49) (2.03)* (2.22)*
Country fixed efects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quintile fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.053 0.074 0.080 0.053 0.063
Observations 6364 6357 7200 7193 7203 7196







Household lost income 0.132 0.129 0.127
(11.85)** (11.55)** (11.37)**
House had savings -0.089 -0.083 -0.074
(7.1 1 )** (6.40)** (5.58)**
Household got credit in 1999 0.018 0.017 0.022
(1.25) (1.22) (1.52)
Schooling of the head -0.003 -0.001
(2.14)* (0.40)
Head older than 60 -0.057 -0.051
(3.67)** (3.27)**
Head younger than 25 -0.047 -0.050
(2.20)* (2.34)*
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Quintile fixed-effects No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.119 0.120
Observations 7143 7142 7135
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1 % level.
Income 
loss 
Lack of savings 
Lack of credit 
Lack of  insurance 
Labor  force participation 
More  hours 
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